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UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The transformation of American society since World War II has
caused us to rethink the social and economic role of men and women
in marriage.1 A major focus of this reexamination has been the quest
for a marital property system that adequately reflects the changes that
have occurred.2 A milestone in this quest is the Uniform Marital
Property Act (UMPA), promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its annual meeting in 1983.3
The Commissioners have described the act as a "statute speaking to
the realities and equities of marriages in America in the Eighties."4
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the Uniform Marital Prop-
erty Act in order to determine whether it establishes a norm that re-
flects the values that our society should foster.
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE UNIFORM
MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
A. The Evolution of Initial Common Law Concepts
At first glance there seem to be many different matrimonial prop-
erty regimes in Western societies.5 A closer examination reveals that
these diverse systems are in fact variations on two themes, community
property and separate property.6
1. See generally E. BURGESS, H. LOCKE & M. THoMEs, THE FAMILY FROM INSTITu-
TION TO COMPANIONSHIP (3d ed. 1963); F. Cox, AMERICAN MARRIAGE: A CHANG-
ING SCENE? (2d ed. 1976); C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMRICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980); B. FRiEDAN, THE SEC-
OND STAGE (1981); Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAmETrE L.J. 441 (1976);
Rheinstein, The Transformation of Marriage and the Law, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 463
(1973); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CA-
LiF. L. REv. 1169 (1974); Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM. L.Q. 415
(1980).
2. See generally de Funiak Community Property Trend, 23 NOTRE DAME LAw. 293
(1948); Glendon, Is there a Future for Separate Property?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 315 (1974);
Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and
Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO. ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Oldham, Is the Concept
of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. FAM. L. 263 (1984); Prager, Sharing Princi-
ples and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977); Younger,
Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together With
Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 45 (1981); Vaughn,
The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR
L. REV. 20 (1967).
3. UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited
as U.M.P.A.].
4. Id. at § 1.
5. 1. LOEB, THE LEGAL PROPERTY RELATIONS OF MARRIED PARTIES 49 (1900); Lob-
inger, The History of the Conjugal Partnership, 63 AMER. L. REV. 250, 250 (1929).
6. Donahue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideals? Marital Property in England
and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 59 (1979); Greene,
Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common-
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The essence of a community property regime is shared ownership
of property during the marriage.7 Each spouse has a present, one-half
interest in all property that is part of the community.8 For example,
the wife acquires an ownership interest in one-half of the husband's
wages, and the husband acquires an ownership interest in one-half of
the wife's wages. The basic premise of this system is that marriage is a
partnership, and both husband and wife contribute to that partnership
in their own way. 9 The law does not focus on the quantity or the qual-
ity of these contributions. Rather, it presumes equal contribution.
The husband and wife, therefore, are each entitled to one-half of the
fruits of the partnership. 10
Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility With the Cur-
rent View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 71, 71-72 (1979).
7. W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(1975). See also La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 137 P. 426 (1914); W. DE
FUNLAx & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2-3 (1971); Vaughn,
supra note 2. At one time, many community property jurisdictions characterized
the wife's interest in the community as a mere expectancy. In the eight Ameri-
can community property jurisdictions the law is now clear that both the husband
and the wife own a present vested and equal right to the community. See Bartke,
Community Property Law Reform in the United States and in Canada - A Com-
parison and Critique, 50 TUL. L. REv. 213,219-21 (1976). See infra text accompa-
nying note 48.
8. The definition of community is not the same in all community property jurisdic-
tions. The Gananciales system provides that all property acquired through the
labors of the husband and the wife during marriage is classified as community
property. Any property acquired before marriage and all property acquired by
gift, devise, or inheritance is classified as separate property. During marriage
each spouse retains ownership of his or her separate property. It is not part of the
community and is not shared during the marriage or at its termination. Pugh,
The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad De Gananciales, 30 LA. L.
REv. 1, 2-11 (1969).
In the Netherlands, Brazil, South Africa, some Scandinavian countries, and
Portugal, a system of community property evolved that has been aptly named the
universal community of acquests. In these jurisdictions, marriage is treated as a
total community of life; all property of either spouse is included in the commu-
nity regardless of its origin or time of acquisition. See INT'L ENCY. OF COMP. L.
§ 58 (1980).
The deferred community is the most recent variation to emerge: "During the
marriage the spouses own the property they respectively acquire the same as they
would if single. But upon death or divorce each spouse is entitled to claim a share
in the assets earned by the other spouse during marriage." W. A. REPPY, JR. & C.
SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2d ed 1982). In a de-
ferred, Gananciales system only property acquired by the husband and the wife
during marriage would be divided at the time of death or divorce. In a deferred
universal system, all property owned by either spouse'would be divided at the
time of death or divorce. See 4 INT'L. ENCY. OF COMP. L. §§ 138-61 (1980).
9. See Mabie v. Whittaker, 10 Wash. 656, 662, 39 P. 172, 174-75 (1895); Krauskopf &
Thomas, supra note 2, at 595.
10. This conjugal partnership is not established upon the basis of equality of
contribution of labor or capital. It exists and is enforced under principles
[Vol. 65:120
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On the other hand, a separate marital property regime permits
each spouse to retain individual ownership of his or her property."
During the marriage, both husband and wife have an equal right to
produce property, retain ownership of it, and dispose of such property
without consulting their spouse. They can voluntarily title property
jointly, but they are not required by law to share the fruits of their
labor with their spouse.12
Under such a system, a homemaker's contributions are not recog-
nized. Because she receives no salary with which to purchase prop-
erty, she has none. Her economic position during the marriage,
therefore, is inferior to the status afforded to the homemaker in a
community property regime; she does not gain an ownership interest
in any property titled in her husband's name.13
It has been said that community property and separate property
reflect different attitudes toward marriage.14 Community property ju-
risdictions treat marriage as an economic and emotional partnership
to which both husband and wife make equal contributions.15 Separate
property jurisdictions envision marriage as a relationship between two
equal, but independent and separate persons.16 History tells us, how-
ever, that the modern dichotomy between community and separate
property is more a result of historic accident than a conscious decision
to implement policy. It does not appear that either system was devel-
oped to mirror a societal attitude toward marriage.
A major force in the development of community property in
France was the relative weakness of the French king and the strength
of the French nobility.17 The great French families benefited from a
marital property system that divided the acquests equally between the
which recognize perfect union and equality of enjoyment of gains, re-
gardless of all inequalities induced by accident, misfortune, disease, idle-
ness, or even wasteful habits of one or the other of the spouses.
Routh v. Routh, 57 Tex. 589, 595 (1882).
11. See, eg., I. Lom, supra note 5, at 51; Greene, supra note 6, at 83; Lobinger, supra
note 5, at 250; Mahoney, Economic Sharing During Marriage: Equal Protection,
Spousal Support and the Doctrine of Necessaries, 22 J. FAm. L. 221, 221 (1984).
12. Donahue, supra note 6, at 59; Younger, supra note 2, at 48-59.
13. Glendon, supra note 2, at 316; Green, supra note 6, at 86. While some have
praised community property as favoring women, it in fact assigns wives a
subordinate role. Until recently, the husband had the right to control the com-
munity, including any wages that the wife might earn. The community property
jurisdictions accorded the wife a one-half interest in the marital property but pro-
vided no legal means for her to enforce her rights. Hence, it is hard to argue that
either marital property system favored women. K. DECROW, SEXIST JusTicE 181-
82 (1974).
14. Oldham, supra note 2, at 266. See also Glendon, supra note 2, at 323; Prager,
supra note 2, at 5.
15. Bruch, Of Work, Family Wealth, and Equality, 17 FAm. L.Q. 99, 101 (1983).
16. Prager, supra note 2, at 15-16.
17. Donahue, supra note 6, at 81-84.
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husband and wife. Both sons and daughters could then contribute to
their family's wealth. As one commentator noted:
The French system ensured that much more property passed to the wife's
family if the marriage were childless than did the English system. Her rela-
tives got her family lands back immediately rather than having to wait for the
husband to die (as they did in England if a child had been born to the marriage
and predeceased its father) and they took one-half of the acquired lands (and
in many areas one-half of the moveables as well) rather than losing the whole
to the husband .... 18
While an attempt was made by the French king to prevent the com-
munity property from being divided between the wife's heir and the
husband, he was unsuccessful.19
Similarly, it does not appear that community property was rejected
in England because of a lack of respect for women or a desire to reflect
that society's attitude toward marriage. Rather, in Medieval England
there was a strong movement to unify property ownership in a single
person.20 Hence, the rule of primogeniture and the principle that a
married woman lost all rights to own property during coverture devel-
oped. This unification principle was also reflected in the English mar-
ital property system. An English wife did not acquire an ownership
interest in her husband's property. In fact, after marriage the com-
mon law disabilities attached and the woman even lost power over her
own separate property.21 During coverture, her husband had the right
to sell, enjoy, or consume her personal property.22 On his death, most
of this personal property passed not to her, but to her husband's legal
representative.23 The husband was also entitled to the rents and prof-
its from her real property, and during marriage he had the exclusive
right to manage and control it. A wife could convey her real property
but only with her husband's consent.24 Blackstone described the rela-
tionship as follows: "The husband and wife are one person in law and
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage .... 25
18. Id. at 80.
19. Id. at 82-84.
20. Id. at 81.
21. J. SCHOuLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
DOMESTIc RELATIONS 145 (6th ed. 1921). But see Williams, The Legal Unity of
Husband and Wife, 10 MOD. L. REv. 16 (1947).
22. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 184-85 (1973); W. HOLDSWORTH, HIS-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAw 520, 826 (4th ed. 1927); THE COMPARATIVE LAW OF MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE 666 (A. Renton & G. Phillimore ed. 1910) [hereinafter cited
as Renton & Phillimore].
23. W. McCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAw IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1982);
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 405 (2d ed. 1895); 1 R.
PowEL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 117 (1984).
24. McCLANAHAN, supra note 23, at 31-32; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
23, at 410; Renton & Phillimore, supra note 22, at 694-95.
25. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES 442 (1813) (footnote omitted). Even though the
[Vol. 65:120
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This strong impetus to unify property ownership in a single person
is in part attributable to the consolidation of power in the English king
and the development of the common law courts.2 6 As one author
noted: "In short, the English system seems to have favored the indi-
vidual and suppressed the wife's interest in the process, while the
French favored the lineage and enhanced the wife's interest as a re-
sult."27 Thus, considerations unrelated to the role of women and the
institution of marriage appear to be the primary reasons that the mod-
ern dichotomy between community and separate property evolved.
Once established, the dichotomy was frozen by inertia and cultural
bias. The common law system came to America with the English colo-
nists.28 Expansion moved from the East to the West, and the common
law was rapidly transplanted throughout the United States.29 Most
settlers were not familiar with the civil law, and those who were re-
garded France and Spain as autocracies whose traditions did not be-
long in a new democratic society.3 0 Community property was viewed
as foreign and difficult to understand. A judge in 1855 stated:
We remark that the case involves a large amount of property and that the
questions discussed and to be decided depend upon a foreign system of law
quite different from that to which we were bred, and with which, of course, we
have very little familiarity. These questions, too, spring out of the transac-
tions of a foreign race of men, the French inhabitants of this city, whose man-
ners and customs as well as institutions, both legal and social, were very
different from our own.3 1
In response to this cultural aversion, most American jurisdictions
rejected the entire body of civil law, including community property.
This was often done with general or selective retention statutes with-
out any discussion of the advantages or disadvantages of either system
wife and husband were legally merged during marriage, the common law system
is classified as a separate marital property regime. While control of the wife's
property was vested in the husband, the wife retained the right to pass some of
her personal property and all of her real property to her family at the time of her
death subject to the husband's curtesy. Furthermore, her husband had no right
even during the marriage to dispose of her real property without her consent.
The husband, therefore, acquired the right to use and manage the wife's property,
but the law clearly distinguished between those assets brought to the marriage by
the wife and those assets owned by the husband. While she lost her separate
identity, her property did not. Likewise, the husband's property remained his
during the marriage, and the wife's only interest in it was in the form of dower.
Thus, in England there was unified control of the property during the marriage,
but the husband's and wife's assets were never pooled as they were on the
continent.
26. Donahue, supra note 6, at 81-87.
27. Id. at 81.
28. W. McCLANAHAN, supra note 23, at 58. See also 1 R. POWELT, supra note 23, at
145.
29. W. McCLANAHAN, supra note 23, at 116.
30. Id. at 118.
31. Cutter v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206, 250-51 (1855).
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of marital property.3 2 Only eight American jurisdictions chose to re-
tain the community property system: Texas, California, Louisiana,
Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Arizona, and New Mexico. Many of these
states were familiar with community property principles because they
had been settled by the Spanish.3 3
32. Kirkwood, Historical Background and Objectives of the Law of Community Prop-
erty in the Pacifc Coast States, 11 WASH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1936). See W. McCLANA-
HAN, supra note 23, at 92-113. The constitutional provisons and statutes that
adopted the common law took many forms. When the common law is received or
accepted in general terms, without limitation as to time or as to previous law of
the state, the statute is a "general reception statute." When the common law is
received or accepted only as of a certain date (i.e., all common law in force at time
of Declaration of Independence), it is referred to as a "selective reception stat-
ute." Id.
33. W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 23, at 2. Of these states, Louisiana, Texas, Califor-
nia, New Mexico, and Arizona were settled by either the French or Spanish who
brought with them the community property system. The leaders in these states,
therefore, were conversant with the community property principles. This fact
alone, however, is not enough to explain why community property continued in
these jurisdictions, even after the Spanish left.
Several other American states were settled by the French or Spanish and
community property principles developed in their early histories as well. None-
theless, most of these jurisdictions rejected the civil law and with it the commu-
nity property system. Hence, Spanish and French influence does not fully
explain why community property was retained in some states and rejected in
others. See generally W. McCLANAHAN, supra note 23, at 92-115.
One explanation is that English and American settlers arrived in the midwest
and eliminated the Spanish influence before community property gained a
stronghold. Furthermore, by the time the Western States gained their indepen-
dence from Spain, the flaws of the common law property system were already
being focused upon by the media. Many common law jurisdictions, in fact, had
rejected the common law disabilities that married women were subject to even
though they retained the concept of separate property. Indeed, debates in west-
ern legislative constitutional conventions often focused on this issue of women's
rights:
The only despotism on earth that I would advocate, is the despotism
of the husband. There must be a head and there must be a master in
every household; and I believe this plan by which you propose to make
the wife independent of the husband, is contrary to the laws and provi-
sions of nature--contrary to all the wisdom which we have derived from
experience. This doctrine of women's rights, is the doctrine of those
mental hermaphrodites, Abby Folsom, Fanny Wright and the rest of that
tribe....
At the time the common law was introduced, woman occupied a posi-
tion far inferior to that which she now occupies. As the world has ad-
vanced in civilization, her social position has been the subject of
increased consideration, and by geneal consent of all intelligent men, she
is now regarded as entitled to many of the rights in her peculiar sphere
which were formerly considered as belonging only to man. This part of
the common law (relating to marital property rights) is one of those por-
tions belonging to the dark ages, which has not yet been expunged by the
advance of civilization.
Brown, Debates in the Convention of California in the Foundation of the State
Constitution 259, 262-63 (1851). The California convention finally voted to retain
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B. Shift to the Partnership Concept in Common Law Jurisdictions
While most American jurisdictions rejected community property
without comment, the common law system of marital property that
they adopted has not remained static. In fact, it has drifted away from
the unity concept described by Blackstone toward the partnership
concept that is characteristic of community property.
The first major step in that direction was the adoption of the Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts. These laws were passed in several stages
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.34 They permit-
ted a woman to retain control of her own property even after mar-
riage.35 They also restored her separate legal identity, permitting her
to contract and litigate in her own name.36 With the adoption of the
Married Women's Property Acts, common law jurisdictions accepted,
at least for some purposes, a proposition that community property ju-
risdictions had always adhered to: spouses have separate legal identi-
ties. The reforms did not, however, substitute a different marital
property regime. In fact, they further separated the husband's and
wife's assets. During marriage, their property rights were no longer
affected by their marital status.3 7
The common law system of dower also came under attack at the
same time that the Married Women's Property Acts were being
adopted. Dower entitled a widow to a life estate in one-third of the
community property even though in all other respects it rejected the civil law and
adopted the common law. McMurray, The Beginnings of the Community Prop-
erty System in California and the Adoption of the Common Law, 3 CAIF. L. REV.
359, 369-73 (1915).
34. No single act eliminated all of the common law disabilities. This was accom-
plished in increments, sometimes over a significant period of time. See Act of
March 22, 1844, ch. 117, 1844 Me. Laws 104 (current version at ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 161-63 (1981); Act of April 7, 1848, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307
(current version at N.Y. DOM. RE. LAW § 50 (McKinney 1977)); Chused, Married
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L. REv. 1359, 1397-1400 (1983). See
also Jackson v. Hubbard, 36 Conn. 10, 15-16 (1869); Johnston, Sex and Property:
The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments To-
ward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1068 (1972); Rheinstein, Division of Mari-
tal Property, 12 WniLAMrrE L.J. 413, 414-15 (1976).
35. TEx. CONST. of 1845, art. 7, § 19; Act of Feb. 15, 1839, ch. 46, 1839 Miss. Laws 72;
Act of March 11, 1844, No. 66, 1844 Mich. Pub. Acts 77; Act of March 22, 1844, ch.
117, 1844 Me. Laws 104.
36. See generally Act of March 25,1945, ch. 208,1845 Mass. Acts. 531 (current version
at MASS ANN. LAWs, ch. 209 §§ 1-29 (1981); 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN (1873); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22; Chused, supra
note 34.
37. See Younger, supra note 2, at 63. See also Bristow v. Jennings, 105 Ore. 1, 207 P.
863 (1922). The wife did have an inchoate dower right during marriage but it did
not vest until her husband had died, terminating the marriage relationship. Like-
wise, the husband's curtesy rights did not vest until the wife's death and only
then if a live child had been born to the couple.
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real property of which her husband had been seized during the mar-
riage.3 8 As personal property became a significant component of the
husband's wealth, dower was criticized because it did not provide ade-
quate care for the surviving spouse.3 9 Dower was also criticized be-
cause it only gave the widow a life estate.40 Even though her
homemaking skills had contributed to the acquisition of the husband's
property, she acquired no control over that property. Even on his
death, she remained in the role of a dependent, entitled to lifetime
protection, but without the power to dispose of the fruits of the mar-
riage by either devise, sale or gift.41
In response to these criticisms, many jurisdictions abolished dower
and enacted elective share statutes. These statutes guaranteed a
widow a one-third to one-half interest in her husband's estate.42 Even
if he executed a will leaving her little or nothing, she could elect to
take this statutory share in lieu of the devise. In most states, the hus-
band's real and personal property were subject to the elective share,43
and the right to elect existed regardless of whether the property had
been acquired before marriage or after, and regardless of the length of
the marriage. The elective share was a crude way for the dependent
spouse to share in the marital assets when the marriage ended.
The tax laws have also changed to reflect the partnership model of
marriage. Prior to 1948, couples living in common law property juris-
dictions did not have the advantage of income splitting.4 4 It was avail-
able to couples in community property jurisdictons because of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Poe v. Seaborn.45 The
Court held that a husband living in a community property state should
be taxed on one-half of his income and his wife should be taxed on the
other half, even though the wages had all been derived from the hus-
38. 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 345 (1931).
39. See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS; L LOEB, supra note 5, at 125-
26; R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROwDER, JR., PALMER'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 354 (3d ed. 1978); Note, Modern Law of
Dower, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 585-86 (1914).
40. For a recent discussion of this problem, see L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 375.
See generally Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in the Alabama Probate
Laws, 11 CuM. L. REv. 671, 683-88 (1980).
41. See 2 R. POWELL, supra note 23, at §§ 209, 213; Sayre, Husband and Wife as Statu-
tory Heirs, 42 HARv. L. REv. 330, 331 (1929); Note, Inter Vivos Trusts vs. the Right
of Election Given Surviving Spouses, 40 GEO. L.J. 109 (1951).
42. Most statutes provided that the elective share was equal to the intestate share
that the widow would have been entitled to if her spouse had died without a will.
See Cheny v. Cheny, 110 Me. 61, 85 A. 387 (1912); Klocke v. Klocke, 276 Mo. 572,
208 S.W. 825 (1919); Act of April 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 4, 1929 N.Y. Laws 449, 500-02.
See also L LOEB, supra note 5, at 162.
43. Not all jurisdictions extended the elective share to cover personal property. See
e.g., Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 P. 23 (1918).
44. Younger, supra note 2, at 69.
45. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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band's employment. The Court recognized that a homemaker in a
community property jurisdiction "earned" one-half of her husband's
wages because of her marital status.46 The progressive nature of the
income tax system made this a substantial benefit to persons living in
community property states.47
In response to intense lobbying efforts by common law states that
wanted these tax benefits for their citizens, Congress was finally pres-
sured to pass the Tax Reform Act of 1948. 48 That act permitted a hus-
band and wife to be taxed on family income as if they were members
of a marital partnership, regardless of whether they lived in a com-
mon law or community property jurisdiction.49 It recognized that
both spouses share in the economic fruits of marriage and should be
taxed accordingly. In 1981 the Congress reinforced this partnership
concept of marriage by permitting tax-free transfers of property be-
tween husband and wife at death.50 Finally, the Deficit Reduction Act
46. Id. at 111.
47. See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389,
1401-12 (1975).
48. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 1(a)).
Subsequent to Poe but prior to the 1948 Act, six common law states adopted
the community property system. They were: Hawaii (Act of May 22, 1945, Act
273, 1945 Hawaii Sess. Laws 312 (repealed 1949)); Michigan (Act of July 1, 1947,
No. 317, 1947 Mich. Pub. Acts 517); Nebraska (Act of June 12, 1947, ch. 156, 1947
Neb. Sess. Laws 426 (repealed 1949)); Oklahoma (Act of May 10, 1939, ch. 62, art.
2, 1939 Okla. Sess. Laws 356-60 (repealed 1945), reenacted by Act of May 5, 1945,
titl. 32 ch. 1, 1945 Okla. Sess. Laws 118 (repealed 1949)); Oregon (Act of March 29,
1943, ch. 440, 1943 Or. Laws 656 (repealed 1945), reenacted by Act of July 7, 1947,
ch. 525, 1947, Or. Laws 910 (repealed 1949)); Pennsylvania (Act of July 7, 1947,
1947 Pa. Laws 1423). Hawaii, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon all re-
pealed their community property statutes after the tax inequity was corrected in
1948. The Pennsylvania statute was declared unconstitutional in the case of Wil-
cox v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947). See also Bartke,
Marital Sharing - Why Not Do It By Contract?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1131, 1138-41 (1979);
de Funiak supra note 2, at 293-98; de Funiak, The New Community Property Ju-
risdictions, 22 TUL. L. REv. 264, 265 (1947); Latta & Gemmill, Observations on
Some Pennsylvania Community Property Problems, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 20, 20-22
(1947); Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948,61 HARv.
L. REV. 1097, 1103-16 (1948); Younger, supra note 2, at 69, nn.182-87.
It is clear that these six states enacted community property laws solely be-
cause of the tax advantage. The "radical" change was thought to be justified be-
cause of the money that state residents would save. One state legislator admitted
this: 'The purpose of the recent legislation is primarily to effect savings on Fed-
eral Income Tax. I have been advised that the minimum savings to taxpayers of
Pennsylvania under the bill will be $100,000,000 a year. This is a consideration
that cannot possibly be overlooked." HmToRY OF SENATE BILLs, SEsSIoN OF 1947
122 (Pa).
49. See Surrey, supra note 48, at 1103-16rYounger, supra note 2, at 69.
50. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a), 95 Stat. 172, 301.
Prior to this Act a limited deduction was available for gifts or bequests between
husband and wife. The rules relating to this marital deduction were complex,
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of 1984 authorized tax-free transfer of property between husband and
wife both during marriage or incident to a divorce.51 Our tax laws,
therefore, have been reformed to focus primarily on the marital unit
and not the individuals within it.
In 1963 the drive to reform marital property law gained momen-
tum. In that year, the Committee on Civil and Political Rights of the
President's Commission on the Status of Women examined the status
of marital property law and came to the following conclusion:
Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a different but equally
important contribution. This fact is becoming increasingly recognized in the
realities of American family living. While the laws of other countries have
reflected this trend, family laws in the United States have lagged behind. Ac-
cordingly, the Committee concludes that during marriage each spouse should
have a legally defined and substantial right in the earnings of the other spouse
and in the real and personal property acquired as a result of such earnings, as
well as in the management of such earnings and property.5 2
The reform suggested by this committee was supported by vocal
adherents, but no legislative action was forthcoming. The debate that
ensued, however, did provide the impetus for the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act (UMDA) that was promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970.53 It is this
act that has substantially narrowed the gap between community and
separate property systems.
Prior to the UMDA, most states divided property according to title
upon dissolution of a marriage.5 4 If all or most of the property was
titled in the husband's name, he left the marriage with his assets in-
tact. Common law jurisdictions provided "protection" for the depen-
dent homemaker in the form of alimony.55
The proposed UMDA changed this system of property division and
and in the absence of an estate plan, the property owned by the marital unit was
subject to estate tax one and one-half times. Half was taxed when the first spouse
died and the whole was taxed when the second spouse died. The Congress con-
cluded that an individual should be free to devise his entire estate to his spouse
without any tax consequences. See Internal Revenue Acts 1980-1981, 1604 (West
Publishing Co.).
51. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421(a), 98 Stat. 494, 793-94 (to
be codified at I.R.C. § 1041). The pertinent part of the section states: "General
Rule - No gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of property from an indi-
vidual to (or in trust for the benefit of) - (1) a spouse, or (2) a former spouse, but
only if the transfer is incident to the divorce." I.R.C. § 1041(a) (West Supp. 1985).
52. COMMITTEE ON CivIL AND PoLIcAL RIGHTS, REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 18 (1963).
53. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 91 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
UMDA].
54. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 180 (1970); Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in
Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1269,1294-99 (1981).
55. Rheinstein, supra note 34, at 415, 424.
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permitted the court to divide property equitably upon divorce.56 Re-
gardless of title, the judge could reallocate the property, awarding a
portion of the property titled in the husband's name to the wife or a
portion of the property titled in the wife's name to the husband.57
When making this division the court was explicitly directed by the
UMIDA to take into account the contributions made by a homemaker
in acquisition of the marital property.5 S The basic premise of the
UMDA was that marriage is a partnership that accumulates property.
When that partnership dissolves, each partner is entitled to a share of
the property.
While the UMDA has not been widely adopted, it has influenced
substantially the way in which property is divided in common law ju-
risdictions at the time of divorce.59 Judges in all but one of the forty-
two common law states now have the power to distribute property re-
gardless of title.60 Some states permit all assets owned by either the
husband or wife to be divided.61 Others permit division of only those
assets produced during the marriage.6 2 They all recognize that both
husband and wife make a contribution to the partnership and thereby
acquire some right to share in each other's property.
Thus, most common law property systems in the United States
have been reformed to implement sharing principles when the mar-
riage ends either by death or divorce. These reforms have had the
effect of substantially diminishing the differences between the com-
munity property jurisdictions and the common law property jurisdic-
tions. When the two systems first emerged as legal institutions they
were in stark contrast to each other. As the common law system has
evolved, however, the two systems have become more alike, bridging
the gap between their old historical differences. As old cultural biases
are discarded, the values and weaknesses of each system can be consid-
ered more objectively. The UMPA now presents the question of
whether these two institutions can be blended to produce a compre-
hensive marital property system during the marriage that is both
workable and consistent with the values that our society should
promote.
56. See Comment, supra note 54, at 1284.
57. UMDA, supra note 69, at § 307, Alternate A. See also Foster, Divorce Reform
and the Uniform Act, 7 FAM. L.Q. 179 (1973); Rheinstein, supra note 34, at 428.
58. UiVDA, supra note 53, at § 307.
59. See J. KRAUSKOPF, CASES ON PROPERTY DIVISION AT MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION 31
(1984).
60. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAm. L.Q. 369,
392 (1985).
61. See id. at 390-91; J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 59, at 32-33. See also Comment, supra
note 54, at 1284-94.
62. See Freed & Walker, supra note 60, at 390-91.
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III. WHAT DOES THE UNIFORM MARITAL
PROPERTY ACT PROVIDE?
The Uniform Marital Property Act is based on four primary princi-
ples.6 3 The first is shared ownership during marriage.6 4 All property
produced by the labors of husband or wife during marriage is classified
as marital property.6 5 Each spouse acquires a vested, undivided one-
half interest in that marital property as it is acquired. The ownership
interest attaches regardless of who produced or earned the property
and regardless of whose name the property is titled in. The sharing
principle is derived from community property law that treats mar-
riage as a partnerhip. 66 Shared ownership is the cornerstone of the
UMPA.
The second principle of the Act is title-based management. This
principle is derived from the common-law rule that whoever has title
to property has the right to manage and control it.67 Drafters of the
UMPA, however, are quick to note that title and ownership are not
synonymous terms under the Act.6 8 Title-based management is a fa-
miliar device in common law jurisdictions and is a simple method to
facilitate the transfer of property and to protect third parties. Man-
agement rights do not alter the rule that each partner owns half of the
marital property.
The third principle of the UMPA is that a husband and wife should
be able to alter their financial relationship by contract.69 This princi-
ple insures flexibility. The UMPA sets the norm but also accommo-
63. The scope of this article does not permit a detailed analysis of the Uniform Mari-
tal Property Act. For a discussion of the credit implications of the UMPA, see
Wellman, Third Party Interests under the Uniform Marital Property Act, 21
Hous. L. REv. 717, 737-56 (1984); Note, Sharing Debts: Creditors and Debtors
Under the Uniform Marital Property Act, 69 MiNN. L. REV. 111 (1984). For a
more detailed analysis of the marital agreement provision of the UMPA, see Old-
ham, Premarital Contracts are now Enforceable, Unless.. ., 21 Hous. L. REv. 757
(1984). For a more detailed analysis of the affect of the UMPA on real estate
transactions, see Horton, Real Estate and Conveyancing Under the Marital Prop-
erty Act, 57 Wis. BAR BULL. No. 7, at 25 (1984).
64. See Reppy, Jr., The Uniform Marital Property Act: Some Suggested Revisions for
a Basically Sound Act, 21 Hous. L. REV. 679 (1984); J. KRAUiSKOPF, supra note 59,
at 38-39. See generally Cantwell, Drafting the Uniform Marital Property Act
The Issues and Debate, 21 Hous. L. REv. 669 (1984).
65. UMPA, supra note 3, at § 4(d) (Supp. 1985).
66. See Wenig, The Uniform Marital Property Act, 69 WOMEN LAW J. 9, 10, (1983).
67. Cantwell, supra note 64, at 607. The title-based management system has also
been used to some extent in community property jurisdictions. California and
Washington have statutes that protect third parties who have relied on record
title. In Louisiana, New Mexico and Texas, the spouse with title has the right to
sole management of that property.
68. UMPA, supra note 3, at comment (Supp. 1985).
69. Id. at § 10 comment.
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dates the varied marital relationships that are evolving in the
twentieth century.
The fourth principle of the UMPA is that it defines property rights
only during the marriage.70 The UMdPA is not intended to govern the
division of property at the termination of the marriage by death or
divorce. Probate and dissolution laws need not be altered if the
UMPA is adopted.
A. Principle 1: Shared Ownership
The UMPA recognizes that marriage is an economic partnership.
Each spouse makes an equal contribution to the partnership and is
entitled to one-half of the partnership property. Only property pro-
duced by the husband and wife during marriage is classified as marital
and shared equally. Property acquired before the marriage is not
shared, nor is property acquired by gift or inheritance.71 To reduce
evidentiary problems caused by these classifications, the Act presumes
that all property owned by either husband or wife is marital prop-
erty.72 The burden is on the person contesting this classification to
show that the property was acquired before marriage, by gift, inheri-
tance, or one of the other exceptions listed in the Act.
Income from any type of separate property received during the
marriage is classified as marital property.73 Likewise, if separate
property increases in value because one of the spouses contributes sub-
stantial labor or skill, the appreciation is classified as marital.74 Fi-
nally, if marital and separate assets are commingled, the whole is
treated as marital property and shared unless the non-marital compo-
nent can be traced.75
While these rules of classification are complex, lawyers in many
common law jurisdictions are already familiar with them. In twenty-
seven states the courts are authorized to divide only marital property
at the time of divorce.76 In these jurisdictions the distinction between
separate and marital property is already being made. In fifteen states
the courts can divide any property owned by either the husband or
wife, regardless of when or how it was acquired.77 Even in these juris-
dictions, the courts are frequently required to take into account the
70. Id. at Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 1985).
71. Id. at §§ 4(f), 4(g)(1).
72. Id. at § 4(b).
73. Id. at § 4(d). This provision has been criticized in that it fails to take into account
inflationary pressures. In a society where inflation is high, the value of the prop-
erty may not keep up with inflation if the income from the property is not also
classified as separate property.
74. Id. at § 14(b).
75. Id. at § 14(a).
76. See Freed & Walker, supra note 60, at 390-91.
77. See id.
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source of the property in order to make the division equitable.7 8
While there are some similarities between UMPA and common
law equitable distribution statutes, the application of the sharing prin-
ciple during marriage will create many substantive rights that are not
now found in common law jurisdictions. The shared ownership princi-
ple of the UMPA permits each spouse to accumulate an estate that can
be devised individually at death. At common law, a homemaker had
no estate to transmit on her death because she acquired no property
during the marriage. She shared in the economic fruits of the mar-
riage only when her husband died first. In contrast, under the UMPA
she owns half of the marital property and therefore has testamentary
control over that half.79
Shared ownership also promotes joint management of the marital
property during the marriage. Both husband and wife are encouraged
to make joint decisions concerning the allocation of family resources
because each spouse owns half of the property. On the other hand,
common law jurisdictions promote individual control and decision
making; whoever has title to the property owns it. The other spouse
has no interest in the property and is neither encouraged nor required
to participate in its management.8 0
Third parties are also encouraged to treat the family as an eco-
nomic unit. Each spouse can seek credit in his or her own name. Even
non-wage earners could qualify for credit based on their share of the
marital property.8 1 The Act promotes equal access to credit, but also
78. Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W. 2d 142 (1970).
79. The Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1983, at 50.
80. The UMPA could also inhibit joint management of the family assets because of
its title based management system: whoever holds title controls the property.
The difference is that under the UMPA, the husband and wife both retain a one-
half ownership interest in the property, regardless of title. The title holder owes
his spouse a duty of good faith in all transactions involving marital property and
must remain aware of his partner's interests. More importantly, the non-title
holder has a right to have his or her name added to the title, thereby guarantee-
ing a right to joint management. Ultimately, the concept of joint ownership will
encourage mutual participation in the allocation of the marital resources. See
UMPA, supra note 3, at § 15 comments (citing W. DE FUINIAK & M. VAUGHN,
supra note 7, at 360-65 § 151).
81. Bugge, Credit under Wisconsin's Marital Property Act, 57 Wis. BAR BULL No. 7,
21 (1984). The UMPA does not prohibit creditors from demanding that both
spouses be responsible for all credit extensions. If both spouses are obligated,
then either the husband's or the wife's property can be reached by the creditor to
satisfy the debt and any property owned jointly by them could be reached as well.
Of couse, if both spouses are required to sign, then neither has individual access
to credit. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, however, prohibits creditors in
community property states from requiring both spouses' signature when the ap-
plicant spouse controls enough assets to justify the extension of credit in their
own name. See Equal Credit Opportunity, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(3) (1985). If con-
trol determines who has a right to get credit without their spouse's signature, the
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imposes equal responsibility for family debt. Any credit purchases by
husband or wife are presumed to be for the benefit of the family.8 2
The "family" creditors can reach all marital property as well as any
separate property owned by the incurring spouse.83 If the debt is not
incurred for the benefit of the family, then the creditor can reach only
the separate property of the incurring spouse and his or her share of
the marital property.8 4 This system protects third parties who extend
credit to either spouse and also permits spouses to develop their own
credit history.
B. Principle 2: Title-Based Management and Control
The purpose of title-based management is to ensure the protection
of third parties dealing with the marital partnership and to provide a
simple and reliable method for transferring marital assets.8 5 Because
it is derived from the common law,86 title-based management will also
make it easier for separate property jurisdictions to make the transi-
tion to the UIVIPA.
If marital property is titled in the name of one spouse only, the
UMPA gives that spouse the right to manage and control it.87 Without
the consent of their partner they can sell, transfer, or lease the prop-
erty. If the marital property is titled jointly, then both spouses have a
right to manage and control the property, and consent from each
spouse is required for a valid transfer.8 8 This is anlagous to the effect
of joint titling in common-law jurisdictions. If the property is titled in
the disjunctive, then each spouse has the right to manage and control
the property and either spouse can transfer an interest in the property
to a third party without the consent or joinder of the other spouse.8 9
Finally, either spouse acting alone has a right to manage and control
untitled marital property such as household goods, furniture and
homemaker whose husband will not voluntarily title the community property
jointly may still find it difficult to get credit without her husband's signature.
82. UMPA, supra note 3, at 8 (Supp. 1985).
83. Id. at § 8(b)(ii).
84. Id at § 8(b)(iv). While the UMPA is intended to protect creditors, its purpose is
not to enhance their position. Hence, an obligation incurred by a spouse prior to
marriage can be satisfied only out of property that would have been available to
the creditor had there been no marriage. If a spouse incurred a debt prior to
marriage, the creditor could reach the earnings of the debtor spouse to satisfy the
debt, but the creditor could not reach the debtor's marital interest in property
produced by their partner. But for the marriage, this property would not be owed
by debtor. Id at § 8(b)(iii).
85. Cantwell, supra note 64, at 673-74.
86. Id. at 607.
87. UMIPA, supra note 3, at § 5(9)(2) (Supp. 1985).
88. Id. at § 5(6).
89. Id. at § 5(a)(6).
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cash.90
While title is nearly synonymous with ownership in common law
states, the same is not true under the UMPA. Vis-a-vis third parties,
the spouse with the right of management and control is treated as the
"owner." In relation to each other, the partner with the right of man-
agement and control holds only a one-half ownership interest in the
marital property.91
In practice, the title-based management system could defeat the
sharing principle of the UMPA. Each spouse could use their salary to
purchase property and then title it in their individual names. As title
holder, they would then have a right to exclusive control of that prop-
erty during the marriage. 92 They could then destroy their partner's
ownership interest by transferring or consuming the property without
their spouse's consent, reducing the sharing principle to nothing more
than a fiction. Title-based management might also discourage joint
decision making since only one spouse would be in control of the prop-
erty.93 In response to these concerns, the Act incorporates two
safeguards.
First, in all matters involving marital property, spouses owe their
partners a duty of good faith.94 The good faith requirement was added
to balance the sharing principle of the UMPA with its title-based man-
agement system.95 The title holder can control the property, but not
in a way that benefits the title holder at the expense of his or her
spouse.
The act does not define the parameters of the good faith require-
ment. The drafters of the UMPA make it clear, however, that the
spouses do not hold marital property as trustees, nor must they suc-
ceed in every venture involving marital property.96 Although the
good faith standard does not create a fiduciary relationship between
husband and wife, the non-title holder is not required to prove fraud
in order to establish a breach of the good faith standard.
Because there are no definitive guidelines for determining when
the duty of good faith has been breached, the court should consider
the purpose of the UMPA and the good faith requirement. The title
holder does not have a duty to be perfect, but neither should the title
holder be allowed to take advantage of the spouse's trust and confi-
dence. A husband and wife are expected to care for each other, and
should not engage in a property transaction that benefits one at the
90. Id. at § 5(a)(2).
91. See id. at § 5 comment.
92. See generally Cantwell, supra note 64, at. 673-74.
93. See supra note 80.
94. UMPA, supra note 3, at § 2 (Supp. 1985).
95. Cantwell, supra note 64, at 674.
96. UMPA, supra note 3, at § 2 comments (Supp. 1985). See also id. at § 5 comment.
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expense of the other. This would undermine the trust that is an es-
sential component of the marital relationship. Conduct that breaches
that trust should be a violation of the good faith requirement. 97
The good faith requirement is meaningless unless there is some
penalty for breaching it. If the title holder violates the good faith stan-
dard by transferring marital property to a bona fide purchaser, can the
non-title holder retrieve it? The answer is no. A bona fide purchaser
for value has the right to rely on title to determine who has the power
to dispose of marital property.98 Even if the title holder breaches his
duty of good faith, the bona fide purchaser for value takes the prop-
erty free of any claim that the other spouse might have.99
While the bona fide purchaser is not affected by the violation of
good faith, the UMPA does provide the injured spouse with a remedy.
The Act recognizes that a right without a remedy is a nullity. Hence,
the drafters of the Act developed methods for protecting the spouse
without title.
The Act permits a court to retitle marital property to insure joint
management and control.o0 For example, the husband could be or-
dered to add his wife's name to the title so that neither could act with-
out the consent of the other. The Act also authorizes the court to
order an accounting and to determine the right of beneficial enjoy-
ment and access to marital property. These remedies appear to be dis-
cretionary, but it is unclear what a court should take into account
when making the decision to grant or deny the requested relief. If
there has been a violation of the duty of good faith, then an account-
ing, title change, or an action for damages would clearly be appropri-
ate. But what if the title holder is just a bad business person? Should
the court add the other spouse's name to the title so that joint manage-
ment is required? Could the title holder be enjoined from disposing of
or encumbering the property without the partner's consent? The Act
is drafted in such general terms that these questions cannot be an-
swered with any certainty. The purpose for the interspousal remedies,
as stated in the UMPA comments, gives some guidance.
The Basis: The rationale of the section is well explained in de Funiak and
Vaughn, Principles of Community Property, § 151 (1971). There it is pointed
out that in community property jurisdictions 'it must follow as a logical result
that each is entitled to protect or enforce against the other his or her rights in
the common property or to enforce or protect as against the other his or her
97. The good faith requirement is difficult to define and as a result it will be difficult
to predict when it has been violated. On the other hand, because the term re-
quires judicial interpretation, the objectionable conduct can be evaluated on a
case by case basis. Predictability may be lost but flexibility is preserved.
98. Id. at § 7 (Supp. 1985).
99. For a discussion of who can qualify under the Act as a bona fide purchaser, see
Wellman, supra note 63, at 718-30.
100. UMPA, supra note 3, at § 15 (Supp. 1985).
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rights in separate property, even by civil action. . . . If this right to sue did
not exist, one spouse, especially if the title to the property were in his or her
name, might be enabled to appropriate community property to his or her own
use or otherwise deny or injure the rights therein of the other spouse without
the other spouse having any remedy whereby to defeat such conduct.'1 01
Remedies should therefore be crafted to ensure that both spouses
can, if they wish, participate in the management of marital property.
If consensus cannot be reached, then the court has the right to divide
the marital property and permit each spouse to control his share
alone.
It may be correct that a marriage is in serious trouble when these
interspousal remedies are required, but they at least give a spouse the
option to preserve the relationship. If no interspousal remedies were
permitted, the injured spouse would have no recourse but to seek a
dissolution in order to assert his or her property rights. These reme-
dies would give the spouse of an alcoholic or gambler an opportunity
to maintain the marriage and preserve the family assets as well. Some
spouses may prefer to remain in the marriage, but not at the risk of
their economic security. The interspousal remedies could also benefit
the children of a marriage by preventing the dissipation of family
income.
C. Principle 3: Marriage Contracts Approved
At common-law marital agreements that altered the obligations of
the parties during the marriage were unenforceable. 02 Marriage was
regarded as a civil contract to which the state was a party; the husband
and wife alone could not alter the relationship that the state deemed
appropriate.10 3 Marital agreements, however, that controlled the dis-
position of property at death were valid. 04 Recently there has been a
significant trend toward enforcing ante-nuptial agreements at divorce
as well as death.105 The Uniform Marital Property Act expands this
101. Id. at § 15 comment (Supp. 1985). The Wisconsin legislature made substantial
changes in the interspousal remedy section before it enacted the UMPA. In Wis-
consin the injured spouse may request an order that limits or terminates their
spouse's right to participate in the management of marital property. The court is
also authorized to enter an order that permits each party to classify property that
they acquire in the future as individual so that their spouse has no interest in it.
For additional remedies see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.70 (West Supp. 1984).
102. 2 A. LNDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CoNTRACTs pt. 4,
§ 90, at 90-31 to 90-36 (1985).
103. See C. VERNIER, supra note 38, at 51-53. See also Eule v. Eule, 24 M1. App. 3d 83,
87, 320 N.E.2d 506, 510 (1974); Schoonmaker v. Schoonmaker, 21 A.D.2d 777, 778,
250 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980 (App. Div. 1964).
104. In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 485, 516 P.2d 289, 295, 110 Cal. Rptr.
897, 901 (1973); In re Estate of Moss, 200 Neb. 215, 263 N.W.2d 98 (1978); In re
Paulson's Will, 254 Wis. 258, 36 N.W.2d 95 (1949).
105. Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Originally, ante-nuptial
agreements that contained provisions concerning alimony or the division of prop-
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trend and permits a husband and wife to define their respective prop-
erty rights during the marriage. The Act provides that a husband and
wife may determine by contract the ownership rights to all property
that they own or which will be acquired during the marriage.106 They
may also provide for the disposition of their property at dissolution,
death, or any other point in their relationship.107 With some excep-
tions, they can even contract to modify or eliminate spousal
support.1 05
All contracts must be in writing and signed by both husband and
wife.109 They can be executed either before or after the marriage.
Marital agreements entered into during the marriage, however, are
subject to much greater scrutiny than those executed prior to mar-
riage. The UMPA recognizes that a post-nuptial agreement cannot be
classified as an arms-length transaction. The trusting relationship be-
tween a husband and wife makes both parties susceptible to accepting
an agreement without carefully reviewing it. The parties may be more
skeptical of property arrangements proposed prior to marriage and
are, therefore, better equipped to look after their own interests. Thus,
an agreement executed prior to marriage will be enforced even if it is
unfair, so long as the property and financial obligations of each spouse
have been fairly disclosed prior to signature.110 On the other hand, an
agreement made after marriage will not be enforced unless (1) it is
conscionable, and (2) each spouse has been provided with a fair and
reasonable disclosure of his or her partner's assets and liabilities.111
erty at divorce were suspect. The courts were concerned that these provisions
would induce divorce if the contract rights were very favorable to one of the
spouses. Generally these provisions were unenforceable. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 217 Ga. 234,253-55,123 S.E.2d 115,132-34 (1961); Ranney v. Ranney, 219
Kan. 428,431-32,548 P.2d 734,737-38 (1976); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288,293
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1964). In recent years, in the wave of the no-fault divorce stat-
utes, the courts have begun to enforce contractual provisons that relate to prop-
erty division at the time of divorce. See In re Marriage of Stokes, 43 Colo. App.
461, 608 P.2d 824 (1979); Singer v. Singer, 318 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 340, 352 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1976).
106. UMPA, supra note 3, at § 10(c)(1) (Supp. 1985).
107. Id. at § 10(c)(3). The UMPA has a unique provision that permits the parties to
agree that their property will pass to their spouse at the time of death without
probate and without the necessity of a will. This provision of the UMPA is de-
rived from WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.120 (1974). It is consistent with the
growing trend to permit the disposition of property without probate and without
strict compliance with the Statute of Wills.
108. UMPA, supra note 3, at § 10(c)(4) (Supp. 1985). If enforcement of a contract
would result in a spouse qualifying for public assistance, then the contract will be
unenforceable as written. The court is authorized to order payment of sufficient
maintenance to avoid the need for public assistance. Maintenance above this
minimal threshold level could be barred by the contract.
109. Id at § 10(a) (Supp. 1985).
110. Id. at § 10(g)(2)(i).
111. Id. at § 10(f)(1) & (f)(3)(i).
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There are certain results that a marital property agreement may
never achieve, regardless of when it is executed. First, the agreement
may not adversely affect the right of a child to support.112 Second, the
marital agreement cannot alter the requirement of good-faith deal-
ing.' 13 Third, a marital property agreement cannot adversely affect
the interests of a creditor unless the creditor had actual knowledge of
the pertinent provisions when the obligation to the creditor was in-
curred. Fourth, marital property agreements cannot affect the rights
of a bona fide purchaser.- 4
D. Principle 4: Marital Property Statute Only
The UMPA is not intended to govern the division of property at
the termination of the marriage by either divorce or death. It is solely
a property statute that regulates the rights of the marital partner dur-
ing marriage. The equitable division statutes applicable in most com-
mon law property jurisdictions will still control the disposition of
property at divorce, even after the Act is adopted.
For example, in a UMPA jurisdiction, a husband and wife would
each own one-half of the marital property during marriage, but, if the
marriage were terminated by divorce, the court need not divide the
property equally. Rather, it would make a division on the basis of the
state's dissolution statute. For example, one party might receive more
than half of the marital property at the time of divorce because their
financial outlook is inferior. Adoption of the UMPA would not affect
a trial court's authority to make this reallocation of ownership at
divorce."15
The UMPA does not mesh with probate provisions as well as it
does with existing equitable distribution statutes. The Act gives each
spouse one-half of the marital estate during marriage without regard
to title. Therefore, spouses should be able to devise their share of the
marital property as they see fit. In common law jurisdictions all of the
decedent's property is subject to the elective share statute. The sur-
viving spouse is entitled to a statutory share, usually one-third or one-
half, of the decedent's estate regardless of the terms of the will. These
elective share statutes are essential in separate property jurisdictions
because the husband and wife do not share the marital property dur-
ing marriage. The elective share statute is the only guarantee that the
marital partners will share in the property that has been acquired dur-
ing the marriage.116
112. Id. at § 10(b).
113. Id. at § 2(a).
114. For a general discussion of the rights of a creditor or bona fide purchaser when a
marital agreement is in existence, see Wellman supra note 63.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 187-89.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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The UMPA, however, gives each spouse one-half of the marital
property during marriage. The elective share statute would then give
the surviving spouse an additional right to one-third or one-half of the
decedent's half of the marital property. The combination of the
UMPA and the elective share statute would guarantee the surviving
spouse substantially more property than she now receives in a com-
mon law jurisdiction, and it would defeat the right of the decedent to
dispose of his other half of the marital property as he chose. While
this may be a desirable result, it is one that should be considered when
the UMPA is adopted. The draftsmen of the UMPA say that the Act
only governs property rights during marriage but it necessarily has an
impact on testamentary devises if the elective share statute is
retained.17
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RAISED BY THE UNIFORM
MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
While there is no universal agreement that the law is an effective
tool in social engineering,"18 there is a strong argument that legislative
action and public policy do indeed affect societal behavior and atti-
tudes.119 Without careful consideration of the values that will be pro-
moted or subverted by the enactment or retention of a specific law,
legislators may affect societal behavior in an unintended way. As one
commentator noted:
No government, however firm might be its wish, can avoid having policies that
profoundly influence family relationships. This is not to be avoided. The only
option is whether these will be purposeful, intended policies or whether they
will be residual, derivative, in a sense concealed ones .... A nation without
a conscious family policy leaves to chance and mischance an area of social real-
ity of the utmost importance .... 120
Therefore, as legislators decide whether to adopt or reject the Uni-
form Marital Property Act, they should first focus on what values a
marital property system should reflect.
In the past there has been too little legislative attention paid to the
values that are promoted by the common law property scheme. This
117. Some community property jurisdiction have statutes analogous to the common
law elective share provisions. There are, therefore, justifications for retaining
them in a modified form even in a jurisdiction that adopts the UMPA. See
Greene, supra note 6, at 104-05.
118. L. LEWELLYN, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931). See generally R. WE=, PATrERNS OF LEGAL
THOUGHT (1978); Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
697 (1931).
119. W. GOEDECKE, CHANGE AND THE LAW 5-7 (1969); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
199-200 (1961); 1. JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAw 126-52
(1980).
120. A. MYRDAL, NATION AND FAMILY vi (1968). But c.f G. STEINER, TEE FuTIITY OF
FAMILY PoucY (1981).
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scheme developed out of the unique legal institutions of medieval Eng-
land, and our ancestors retained it because it was familiar and consis-
tent with their English heritage.12 1 While this system has not
remained static,1 22 its basic premise is intact. During marriage, a hus-
band and wife are not required to share their property with each
other. They are not treated as an economic unit. Rather, their prop-
erty interests are largely unrelated to their status as husband and
wife. This common law marital property system promotes the ideal of
individuality. Equality between the spouses is achieved by giving each
of them the right to keep whatever they can produce.
In contrast, the UMPA promotes the ideal of marital sharing. Mar-
riage is treated as an economic partnership. Each partner is expected
to sacrifice their individual rights in order to promote the best inter-
ests of the partnership. The loss of individual rights is justified by the
identifiable benefits that result from participation in the marital unit.
Economic equality between the spouses is achieved by giving each one-
half of the fruits of the marital partnership.1 2 3
The thesis of this Article is that this ideal of sharing should be re-
flected in our marital property system. The common law system that
reflects the ideal of individuality should be discarded and replaced by
the UMPA. This is so even though the adoption of the UMPA will, at
least temporarily, produce some increased litigation and confusion.
Major law revisions are naturally disruptive. Lawyers must learn new
ways of doing things. Judicial interpretation is often needed to flesh
out the statutory language, and implementation can reveal mechanical
defects that require legislative correction and refinement. The burden
of change, however, must be measured against the benefit that the re-
vision may achieve.
In the late 1930's and 40's several American jurisdictions decided to
risk a change to community property in order to reduce the federal
tax bill that their citizens would pay. 2 4 Their legislators recognized
the potential problems that such a switch might generate but the fi-
nancial rewards were deemed to be high enough to justify the poten-
tial harm. As one legislator noted:
The purpose of the recent legislation is primarily to effect savings on Fed-
eral Income Tax. I have been advised that the minimum savings to taxpayers
of Pennsylvania under this bill will be $100,000,000 a year. This is a considera-
tion that cannot possibly be overlooked.
I am not unaware that such a radical change in the law of Pennsylvania
will cause some confusion and will be the cause of considerable litigation; but
the fact that $100,000,000 will be saved to the taxpayers of the Commonwealth
is such a vast amount of money, particularly at a time the taxes are generally
121. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 36-63 and accompanying text.
123. Prager, supra note 2, at 6.
124. See generally supra note 49.
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so onerous, that I believe that it is in the interest of the people of the Com-
monwealth to approve the bill and run the risk of the confusion that will be
caused by the new legislation. 12 5
It is likely that all forty-two common law jurisdictions would have
switched to community property had Congress not enacted the Reve-
nue Act of 1948.126 The question today is whether our legislators are
willing to risk the same change in order to promote sharing as the
appropriate behavior in the marital relationship.
A. The Child Rearing Function of Marriage
The institution of marriage has been recognized by jurists as one of
the most important components of western civilization. In recognition
of the interlocking function of marriage, the family, and government,
legislators and judges have concluded that the marital relationship
must be subject to state regulation.12 7 One court observed:
Marriage is more than a personal relation between a man and a woman. It
is a status founded on contract and established by law. It constitutes an insti-
tution involving the highest interests of society. It is regulated and controlled
by law based upon principles of public policy affecting the welfare of the peo-
ple of the state.12 8
By according rights to a husband and wife and imposing respon-
sbilities on them, the law seeks to stabilize the institution of marriage
and to define it in a way that promotes the best interests of the soci-
ety.129 Hence, not everyone has the same rights that a man and wo-
man acquire upon marriage. Only spouses are entitled to hold
property as tenants by the entirety, to file a joint income tax return, to
elect a share of a decedent's estate, or to claim a loss of consortium.
The law also imposes certain burdens on the marital partners. They
can not sever the relationship without judicial approval, and in some
jurisdictions a husband and wife have reciprocal duties of support. 30
Their right to sue each other may be limited by the doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity,'13 or they could be prevented from testifying
at a trial because of the husband and wife communication privilege.132
125. HISTORY OF SENATE BYLS, SESSION OF 1947 122 (Pa).
126. Younger, supra note 2, at 69. See also Surrey, supra note 48, at 1104.
127. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878); H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 32-35 (1968); C. VERNIER, supra note 38, at 45.
128. Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 272, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936). See also Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376
(1971).
129. See generally, H. CLARK, supra note 126, at 36; C. VERNIER, supra note 38, at 45-
48; Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy -
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 487-88
(1983).
130. State v. Clark, 88 Wash. 2d 533, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977); VA. CODE § 20-61 (1983).
131. Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
132. F. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 188-203 (3d ed. 1984).
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This intensive governmental regulation of marriage has been the
subject of substantial criticism as an unjustified interference with an
essentailly private relationship: "Of all actions of man's life, his mar-
riage does least concerne other people, yet of all accons of our life 'tis
most medled with by other people."'133
In response, judges have, paradoxically, labeled marriage as "inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred,"134 but so important to the "morals
and civilization of a people" that it must be subject to governmental
regulation.135 Legal scholarship has, however, paid surprisingly little
attention to the justifications for this extensive regulation of the fam-
ily. As one commentator noted:
Perhaps because family life is so much a part of the unspecifiable bedrock of
society, there has been a puzzling inattention in both legal and other literature
to the broad social policies underlying the preference historically given by the
law to family relationships. This contrasts remarkably with the voluminous
scholarly work on individual rights.
1 3 6
Sociologists point to one primary reason that all societies have reg-
ulated the family unit in one way or another: the necessity for a stable
environment in which to nurture children. 3 7 Humans have an ex-
tended period of dependency during childhood. While other animals
mature in a few weeks or months, it takes years for a human to be-
come self-sufficient. Furthermore, because of our complex neurologi-
cal systems, humans are less instinctive and more a product of learned
behavior. Humans can use abstract concepts such as language and
problem solving to adapt to their environment, but it takes time for
such skills to be learned.138 A stable societal unit is needed to teach
these skills and to transmit political and cultural values.139
In western civilization, this unit has traditionally been the family,
headed by a man and woman who have married each other.140 One of
the reasons that marriage is an important component of the familial
relationship is that it regulates sexual relations so that conflict and
jealously will not interfere with the stable and benign environment
that is needed for child-rearing.141
Marriage also ensures that two persons, not one, will be ultimately
responsible for their offspring. Among other species, the mother is
normally responsible for the care of the young. If she dies then her
offspring die as well. Humans regard their children as too valuable to
133. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDON 75 (F. Pollock ed. 1927).
134. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
135. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
136. Hafen, supra note 129, at 472.
137. See generally B. YORBURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY (1973).
138. Id. at 37-81.
139. Hafen, supra note 129, at 476-84.
140. E. LEMAsTERs, PARENTS IN MODERN AMERICA 139 (1974).
141. B. YoRBuRG, supra note 137, at 39.
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be lost just because one parent is gone. If both a mother and father
are responsible for the child, there is a greater likelihood that one will
remain to provide the care that is necessary. The need for two parents
is most acute among humans because it takes so long for the young to
mature; there is a greater likelihood that one parent will die or leave
while the child is still dependent.142
Another characteristic of humans is that we have a longer lifespan
than most species. Because of this, there is often an extended period
of dependency for the elderly in our society. It has been the family
that has been primarily responsible for both groups. Even now with
Medicare, Medicaid, and nursing home facilities, it is the family in
America that most often meets the needs of the dependent elderly:
"Most impaired older people who receive care at home receive it from
a household member, and most receive it for a long period of time.
Family members give 80 percent of the medically related and personal
care to the chronically limited elderly."143 Thus, a primary function of
the family in general, and the marital unit in particular, is to provide
the matrix in which to nurture our young and to care for our elderly.
Both functions futher fundamental social concerns, and both explain
the substantial governmental regulation of marriage.
B. Sex-Linked Roles Within the Marriage: Historical Perspective
Historically, women have been largely responsible for homemak-
ing and child care. They have also been the principle care givers to the
dependent elderly. Because women tend to live longer than their
spouses, elderly men are more likely to be cared for by their wives
than vice-versa.144 When a marital partner is not available to care for
an aged relative, then the responsibility usually falls upon a female in
the next generation-normally the adult daughter or daughter-in-
law. 145
It is not yet clear why women in most human societies have as-
sumed these nurturing roles.146 Freud said that biology was
142. Even in societies where the biological father cannot be identified it is common for
a sociological father to be designated to share the responsibility of raising a child.
See B. YORBURG, supra note 137, at 40. See also B. FARBER, FAMILY ORGANIZA-
TION AND INTERACTION 457 (1964).
143. PANEL ON THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LIFE, PREsmEN'S COIM'N FOR A NAT'L
AGENDA FOR THE EIGHTIEs, THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN I=E IN THE EIGHTIES 78
(1980).
144. Brody, Womenls Changing Roles and Care of the Aging Family, 41 NAT'L J. 14
(1979).
145. Id. at 14-16.
146. From a benign perspective sex-linked roles might be explained by the biological
differences between men and women. Because of her reproductive function, a
woman could efficiently care for the home and the children. Hormonal differ-
ences might also account for the sex linked roles. The male hormone androgen
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destiny.147 But his theories and those of other male therapists are be-
ginning to be seriously questioned by both male and female profes-
sionals who are exploring in increasing numbers the genesis of sex-
based discrimination.148 Regardless of the origin of these sex-linked
roles within the family, it is unquestionable that they do exist and that
the law has played an important role in enforcing them.
The common law dictated that child rearing and homemaking were
the wife's responsibility. The husband's reciprocal obligation was to
provide support for the wife and the dependent children.149 Because
he was the legal head-of-household, the husband could decide what
level of support was appropriate. As long as he kept his spouse and
children from being a burden on society, he was free to run the house-
hold as he chose.150
The Married Women's Property Acts did little to modify this patri-
archal system. While women regained their legal identity, vestiges of
the unity doctrine, which merged a husband and wife into a legal unit,
remained. The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity was a product
of this common law merger,15 ' and it was not until 1960 that two
spouses were capable of violating the criminal conspiracy laws.152 Ad-
ditionally, even after the Married Women's Property Act was enacted,
the law continued to designate the husband as head of the household.
Because the household was dominated and controlled by the husband,
the wife's legal domicile followed her husband.153 In some jurisdic-
tions she was required to take his surname at the time of marriage,1 5 4
makes men more aggressive and the female hormone estrogen makes women
more passive and receptive. Thus it has been argued that men should assume
leadership positions and women should be nurturers:
Such arguments have been used so long that they seem to us "just
common sense." . . . However, the evidence that suggests any necessary
connection between these biological differences and the specific jobs/
characteristics which our society ascribes to male and female is weak and
contradictory. It could with as much reason and as little evidence be
argued that women would make better political leaders because they are
naturally less "assertive" than men and more sensitive to the needs and
feelings of others. Similarly, women would make better brain surgeons
because they are "naturally" so good at detailed and close work.
F. Cox, supra note 1, at 182.
147. S. FREUD, SOME PSYCIfICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANATOMICAL DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN THE SEXES (1925).
148. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's
DEVELOPMENT (1982); A. SCHAEF, WOMEN's REALITY (1981).
149. Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv.
709 (1956).
150. Id. at 720.
151. See supra note 132.
152. United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960).
153. New York Trust Co. v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772, 783 (Del. 1940).
154. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Ala. 1971). But see People ex rel.
Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 67 63 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1945); Stuart v. Board of
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and in others she could not transfer her own separate property unless
he joined in the transaction. 5  Often, a wife had no right to claim the
loss of consortium when her husband was injured on the theory that
she had no enforceable right to her husband's companionship. In con-
trast, a husband could claim loss of consortium for his wife's injury
because he was entitled to her services as a matter of law.156
Reality also perpertuated this patriarchal system. Women had few
options. Society did not permit them to assume responsible, leader-
ship roles outside the home. Women had little ability to control the
number of children that they had because contraceptives were un-
available, and abortion posed substantial health and legal risks. Wo-
men assumed their designated role because it was difficult for them to
assume any other. Because they had limited access to education or the
political process, it was difficult for women to change their position
within the society.
A woman was also conditioned by the society to conform. If she
rejected her role, she could expect criticism. 5 7 If she assumed the
role of homemaker she could expect praise:
A woman who is an effective homemaker must know something about teach-
ing, interior decoration, cooking, dietetics, consumption, psychology, physiol-
ogy, social relations, community resources, clothing, housing, household
equipment, hygiene and a host of other things .... The young woman who
decides upon homemaking as her career need have no feeling of inferiority
.... One may say, as some do, "men can have careers because women make
homes."158
Yet women received mixed messages. Their role was important, but
not worth economic compensation. Their role was valuable, but not as
valuable as their husband's achievements outside the home. Female
psychologists, in fact, are now beginning to perceive that women have
been conditioned to think of themselves as inferior: "To be born fe-
male in this culture means that you were born 'tainted,' that there is
something intrinsically wrong with you that you can never change,
that your birthright is one of innate inferiority."159
Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1973); Chapman v. Phoenix
Nat'l Bank, 85 N.Y. 437, 449 (1881).
155. See Peddy v. Montgomery, 345 So. 2d 631 (Ala. 1977), which declared unconstitu-
tional the Alabama statute that required a husband to join in all real estate trans-
actions involving property titled solely in his wife's name.
156. Smith v. United Construction Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960). This
case was overruled in Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 304 So. 2d
881 (1974).
157. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
158. H. BOwMAN, MARRIAGE FOR MODERNs 66-67 (1942), quoted in B. FRImDAN, THE
FEMININE MYsTIQuE 121 (1974).
159. See A. ScHAEF, supra note 148, at 27.
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C. Breakdown of the Patriarchal System and Its Impact on the Child-
Rearing Function of Marriage
It is little wonder, then, that the Married Women's Property Act
did little to change the legal, moral, and economic forces that kept the
partriarchal system intact. There is evidence, however, that this par-
triarchal system is beginning to crack. Women now have more op-
tions. For the first time in history, they have some effective control
over their reproductive systems. They have access to education and
are beginning to exercise more and more political power.160 Most im-
portantly, women work outside the home and are no longer dependent
on their husbands for economic survival.161 They still have substan-
tial barriers in the work force, but welfare is no longer the alternative
to an unhappy marriage.
Furthermore, the civil rights movement of the 1960's made it so-
cially acceptable to challenge the status quo. During that period wo-
men became more conscious of sex biases in their society. The power
of the pen (or television) was critical in this process. 162 Women were
bombarded with information about the tangible consequences of sex
discrimination and began to recognize that their roles as homemaker
and caregiver had contributed to their inferior economic and societal
status.163
If indeed this patriarchal system is breaking down, what will re-
place it? One option is that women will adopt the values that have
normally spelled success for white males. Given the chance, women
have demonstrated that they can be just as competitive, aggressive,
and dedicated to their careers as men have been. Furthermore, wo-
men have a strong motivation to adopt these "male" characteristics.
Because western society has been dominated by white males, they
have determined what values are worthwhile. They have defined suc-
cess, and whoever does not meet the standard is inferior. As doors
have opened to women, it is little wonder that they have quickly
learned what is expected of them:
If we cannot behave like 'real' women, then we had better become adept at
behaving like men! Whole industries have sprung up that purport to teach
160. Bjorksten & Stewart, Contemporary Trends in American Marriage, in MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 3-19 (C. Nadelson & D.
Polonsky ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Nadelson & Polonsky].
161. Vatter, Structural Change in the Occupational Composition of the Female Labor
Force, in EcoNoMIc INDEPENDENCE FOR WOMEN 211-30 (J. Chapman ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Chapman]; Waldman, Labor Force Statistics from a Family
Perspective, 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16 (No. 12, 1983). See also Krauskopf &
Thomas, supra note 2, at 581.
162. Bjorksten & Stewart, supra note 160, at 17. See generally L. SPENDER, INTRUDERS
ON THE RIGHTS OF MEN (1983).
163. See, e.g., Griffiths, How Much is a Woman Worth - The American Public Policy,
in Chapman, supra note 161.
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women how to succeed in business. The major underlying message of these
programs is nothing more than a variation on the theme of "why can't a wo-
man be more like a man?" So we try. We try very hard .... We carry
briefcases and learn to assert ourselves. 16 4
To compete by traditional male standards, women must be willing to
work overtime, to change job locations when needed, and to forego the
parent-teacher conference when it conflicts with work schedules.
But if women begin to assume roles and lifestyles normally re-
served for males, then who will be the homemakers? Who will care
for the children and the elderly? If the patriarchal system is breaking
down, what will bind the marital unit together so that its traditional
nurturing function can continue effectively?
One answer is to make the ideal of sharing the social and legal or-
ganizational principle of the marital unit. Husband and wife would be
expected to focus on the needs of the partnership, foregoing their indi-
vidual rights for the good of the whole. The nurturing function of the
marital unit would be the responsibility of both the husband and the
wife, but the partners would be free to allocate the tasks of caregiving,
income production, and domestic chores as they chose. Some partner-
ships may conclude that it is more cost effective for the woman to be a
homemaker. In others, the husband might assume that role. 6 5 In
some partnerships the husband and wife would share the tasks of in-
come production, child care, and domestic chores. In any case, the ul-
timate responsibility for the nurturing and income production
functions of the marital unit would be shared by husband and wife.
Success could be claimed by both and failure would be the responsibil-
ity of each.166
164. A. SCHAEF, supra note 148, at 41.
165. There are 5.9 million families (or 12 percent of all married couples) in which
wives earn more than their husbands. In 1.9 million of these families, only the
wife works outside the home. One reason that there has been an increase in the
number of "house husbands" is the massive layoffs at factories during the late
seventies and early eighties. See Sanoff, When Wives Earn More Than Their
Husbands, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 23, 1984), at 69-70. For a discussion of
what factors might be utilized to determine when it is most cost effective to the
family for the marital partner to remain at home, see M. GEERKEN & W. COVE,
AT HoME AND AT WoRK 123-51 (1983).
166. There have been numerous articles and television shows (for example, The Jane
Pauley Special, aired on NBC Saturday, Mar. 16,1985) that discuss the impact on
family life of women working outside the home. Women have been blamed and
praised, but the focus is always on how women are affecting their family. Rarely
is there an acknowledgement that a husband's decision to work outside the home
also affects the quality of family life. If the emancipation of women means that
they are not solely responsible for the home, then husbands must assume part of
the responsibility. Both husband and wife will be expected to moderate their
career objectives for the well-being of the family. Likewise, if a wife's income is
needed for the welfare of the family, then she must be willing to assume the
responsibility. See Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 2, at 580-81.
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The marital partners would thus be bound by a mutual commit-
ment to the welfare of the family. This voluntary commitment would
replace the patriarchal system that held the marital unit together by
legal, moral, and social force. It would also reinforce the importance
of the nurturing function of marriage. In the past, this nurturing
function has been enshrined in platitudes and cliches but has not re-
ceived serious consideration by judges and lawmakers.167 The legal
structure left a homemaker in a submissive position that was finan-
cially disadvantageous. This is not surprising; most judges and
lawmakers were men and were responsible for income production, not
nurturing. Male jurists emphasized those issues that were most im-
portant and familiar to them. They simply lacked the experiential
background to see the law from any other perspective.
At one time the second-class status of the nurturing role did not
substantially affect family stability. Women had to assume that role
by virtue of law and social pressures. As women learn to make
choices, it is now necessary for the law to reinforce the importance of
nurturing. It is not in the best interest of society for women to discard
their values in order to succeed in a male-dominated culture. For wo-
men this would be the ultimate loss of identity,16s and society would
lose a different but valuable perspective. The "female" values must
receive increased recognition by the whole society. They can no
longer be the basis of discriminatory treatment. If our legal and social
institutions continue to punish individuals who assume the role of
nurturer, both men and women will be discouraged from performing
these tasks. It is no longer enough for jurists to talk about how impor-
tant the family is. It is now necessary that the laws be changed to
insure that neither spouse suffers economically because they have per-
formed caregiving functions.
V. THE UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
AS AN ALTERNATIVE
A. The Advantages of the UMPA
Adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act is one change that
can be made to reemphasize the importance of the family and mar-
riage in America. By promoting shared responsibility as the accepted
and desirable norm, both husband and wife will be encouraged to fo-
cus on the needs of the marital unit. By giving financial recognition to
both income production and nurturing, the law elevates the status of
the caregiver and reemphasizes the importance of the child-rearing
function of marriage. Regardless of the role they assume, husband
and wife each receive one-half of the partnership property under the
167. See Hafen, supra note 129, at 472.
168. See generally A. SCHrAF, supra note 148.
[Vol. 65:120
UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
UMPA. Thus, during marriage neither partner suffers if he or she is
willing to perform caregiving tasks; the partners are free to allocate
these tasks as they see fit.
By according property rights to the husband and wife during mar-
riage, the UMPA also reinforces the special status of the marital part-
nership in various ways. First, as previously discussed,169 the law has
encouraged marriage, rather than cohabitation, by offering benefits
contingent upon a marital status. Second, the sharing principle of the
UMPA encourages each partner to invest in the relationship. As one
commentator stated, "the will to labor and the will to invest depend
on rules which assure [people] that they will indeed be permitted to
enjoy a substantial share of the product as the price of their labor or
their risk of savings."170 Finally, the UMPA promotes effective child
rearing. Self-sacrifice, commitment and compromise are essential to
effective child rearing. These skills are first learned in the family and
then tested and refined in the marital relationship.17 ' By promoting
sharing in the marriage we are also promoting the attitudes that a hus-
band and wife must have to care adequately for their children.
In contrast, the modern common law marital property system does
little to promote the ideal of marriage. This system, which focuses on
individual needs and self-fulfillment, is inconsistent with the child
rearing function of marriage. The common law property system fails
to treat the husband and wife as a unique economic unit during the
marriage; in fact, it treats them as if they were single. The common
law property system, therefore, does not reinforce the special status of
marriage as a means to discourage cohabitation.
There are, of course, other ways to view marriage. In Sweden, the
primary function of marriage is to promote individual happiness.172 A
decision was made in Sweden that during marriage each partner
should have more freedom. Equality was promoted by emphasizing
individual rights.173 The uniqueness of the marriage relationship and
the commitment to sharing are therefore deemphasized.
This attitude toward marriage has been reflected in Swedish mari-
tal property reform. Sweden has rejected its community property
heritage and has substituted the "deferred community." During mar-
riage, the deferred community is analogous to the common law sys-
tem. Neither spouse has any ownership interest in their partner's
169. See supra text accompanying note 130.
170. Hafen, supra note 129, at 486 (quoting Michelman, Property Utility, and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1212 (1967).
171. Hafen, supra note 129, at 477 (quoting W. BERNS, TEE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE FUTURE OF AaEiCAN DEMOCRACY 222 (1976)).
172. M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972).
173. Hunnings, Current Legal Developments, 19 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 156, 164 (1970).
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property. It is not until death or divorce that the marital property is
divided pursuant to community property principle.174 Hence, Sweden
promotes the principle of sharing at the time of death and divorce, but
not during the marriage. This approach is almost identical to the mar-
ital property system that has evolved in most American jurisdictions.
In Sweden, however, the financial responsibility for the care of
children falls on the state welfare system.175 Communities within the
United States are not willing to accept the state as the appropriate
unit for providing economic security for children.176 Nor does the
American public regard marital partners as equal and independent co-
habitants. At least for now, the predominant attitude toward mar-
riage in America is that husband and wife are mutually dependent on
each other and are both responsible for the maintenance of the family.
Their individual happiness is not the only reason for getting married.
Yet, the common law marital property system in forty-two states pro-
motes the same ideal of individuality that Sweden has embraced.
On the other hand, some have argued that the institution of mar-
riage, and the roles of men and women in it, are changing so rapidly
that separate property may be the trend of the future.177 Professor
Glendon, for example, has argued that when equality between men
and women is achieved, a husband and wife would be better off if their
assets were kept separate. 7 8 It is true that the institution of marriage
has changed in America since World War 11.179 Divorce is more preva-
174. Glendon, supra note 2, at 318. See generally supra note 8.
175. Glendon, supra note 2, at 325.
176. The policies of the Reagan Administration reflect a growing conviction that the
government should be less, not more, responsible for children. See W. GRUBB &
M. LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMIsES (1982).
177. Changes are accelerating so rapidly in post World War II America that it is impos-
sible to define with any precision the public's attitude toward marriage. That
attitude may, in fact, vary from age group to age group or depend upon economic
and educational status. Bjorksten & Stewart, supra note 160, at 36. Most litera-
ture that discusses family life in America, however, has a recurring theme that
marriage is a unique institution that involves commitments that cohabiting indi-
viduals have not made. See T. CAPLOW, MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES: FIFTY YEARS OF
CHANGE AND CONTiNurrY 122-24 (1982); B. YORBURG, supra note 137 at 200;
Hafen, supra note 129, at 486. See also Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d
1204 (1979). But cf. Anastasi v. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. 866 (D.N.J. 1982).
178. Glendon, supra note 2, at 327.
179. The stability of American marriage was greatly challenged by the Second World
War. The war made it necessary for women to enter the labor force in order to
support their families. See C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 417-24 (1980). It was also nec-
essary for women to take over traditionally "male jobs" in order to support the
American economy. See S. SCARP, MOTHER CARE/OTHER CARE 111-14 (1984); Es-
kin, Source of Wartime Labor Supply in the United States, 59 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 264-78 (1944). After WWII, a continuing shift of population from the farm to
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lent. More women work outside the home. 8 0 Research seems to indi-
cate, however, that marriage, as opposed to cohabitation, is
flourishing. Sharing is still the norm, not the exception.
The fragmentation and alienation of modern society has, in fact,
enhanced the importance of the marital relationship:
We seek a private home, a private means of transportation, a private laundry
... and do-it-yourself skills of every kind. An enormous technology seems to
have set itself the task of making it unnecessary for one human being ever to
ask anything of another in the course of going about his daily business ....
We seek more and more privacy, and feel more and more alienated and lonely
when we get it.181
This technological isolation increases our need to socialize within the
marriage. People do not get married to preserve individuality. That is
best accomplished by staying single. People get married because they
do not want to be alone. A lifetime commitment to sharing gives a
sense of security and identity.
The extended family is a disappearing phenomenon. Mobility has
decreased the importance of community ties. The days are gone when
neighbors got together to quilt or raise a barn. The sense of isolation is
heightened. Marriage has become the hoped-for panacea. Divorce has
increased because people expect so much from their marriage, not be-
cause they think it unimportant.18 2 The rate of remarriage after di-
vorce demonstrates the continued vitality of the system.
8 3
Implementation of the sharing model during the course of mar-
riage may also serve to reduce some of the acrimony associated with
the division of property at divorce. Nothing will eliminate that acri-
mony completely, but it should not be exacerbated. Our present law
does not require either spouse to share his property during marriage.
the city brought women closer to job opportunities. Grossman, Labor Force Pat-
terns of Single Women, 102 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 46 (1979).
By the early 1960's, radical changes surfaced that included a rapidly falling
marriage rate, an increasing divorce rate, and a decline in fertility. 31 MONTHLY
VrrAL STATISTICS REP. 12 (1983). In the early 1960's, 28 percent of women be-
tween the ages of 20 and 24 had not married; by 1979 it was 49 percent, and by
1981, 52 percent. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Current Population Reports, P-20-
21 (1981-82).
The 1980's, however, seem to be ushering in another era of change. In 1982,
there were 2 percent more marriages than the previous year and 16 percent more
than in 1975. 31 MONTHLY VITAL STATIsTIcs REP. 12 (1983). Also, the divorce
rate seems to be on its way down as 3 percent fewer people divorced in 1982 than
in 1981. Id The present day person seems more willing to change marital part-
ners or styles in order to achieve the ever present ideal of being married and
relating intimately to another person. Nadelson & Polonsky, supra note 160, at
36.
180. M. GEERKEN & W. GovE, supra note 164; Waldman, supra note 161, at 16.
181. R. KEYES, WE, THE LONELY PEOPLE 33 (1973).
182. F. Cox, supra note 1, at 245; Bjorkstein & Stewart, supra note 160, at 40-43.
183. See Bjorksten & Stewart, supra note 160, at 53-57.
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Yet at divorce, when tensions are heightened, the judge can take one
spouse's property and give it to the other. The parties perceive that
they are being deprived of their rights as a result of the divorce pro-
cess, in part because the law governing property ownership during
marriage has not promoted the concept that marriage is an economic
partnership. The divorce process may be less disruptive if we promote
the sharing paradigm during the course of the relationship, and not
just when it ends.
There is, of course, no expectation that a marital property system,
in and of itself, will prevent divorce or eliminate the tensions associ-
ated with it. Nor will the UMPA ensure that both men and women
will recognize the value of nurturing. The impact of the UMPA, how-
ever, should not be underestimated merely because it may not be able
to revolutionize societal attitudes. With time, experience, and refine-
ment, society usually accepts more widely the policies that its laws
promote. The question is what principles will be governing society
when our grandchildren are raising their families. The UMPA is
more likely to promote a rededication to the child rearing function of
marriage than will a common law system that contributes to the no-
tion that marriage is only a vehicle for individual fulfillment.
B. Opposition to the UMPA: Marriage is Not an Economic Partnership
There are opponents to the partnership concept of marriage. They
argue that the introduction of economics into the personal and spiri-
tual relationship that marriage represents is a deviation from the basic
purposes of the institution:
Shall we adopt the rather characteristic tendency of our country and of our
time, to think dominantly in terms of money, of wealth, of things and embody
the modern view of the equality of man and woman in a pronunciamento that
justice as between husband and wife consists in the having of equal shares in
all the things' acquired during marriage through the efforts of either or both?
Or shall we accept an approach simultaneously less mercenary and more indi-
vidualistic, and regard marriage as a sharing of experiences, not primarily con-
cerned with wealth, by two coordinate persons each of whom should be
accorded by law the power to acquire, to control and to dispose of such wealth
as his separate abilities may enable him to secure? 184
Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., past chairman of the ABA Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, has concluded that "[m]arriage is
not an economic partnership. That's a lot of baloney. It might be a
partnership of some other kind."185 In Sweden, the concept of com-
munity property has also been criticized as bourgeois because of its
184. Powell, Community Property -A Critique of its Regulation of Intra-Family Rela-
tions, 11 WASH. L. REv. 12, 15-16 (1936).
185. Winter, UMPA Fights for Recognition, 70 A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 77.
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preoccupation with economics. 8 6
These arguments do not recognize that there have always been eco-
nomic consequences to marriage. Social security benefits are affected
by marital status, and our taxation system treats the married different
from the unmarried. Insurance coverage and pension benefits are
closely related to marital status. Trust law can be traced in large mea-
sure to the need in the Middle Ages to regulate property interests be-
cause of the marital relationship. 8 7 The elective share and intestacy
provisions of the Uniform Probate Code recognize that marriage does
have economic consequences, and the Uniform Marriage and Dissolu-
tion Act is based on the premise that marriage is an economic
partnership.
The real question then is whether the economics of marriage
should be recognized only when the relationship is terminated by
either death or divorce, or whether it should be recognized while the
relationship is still viable.
C. Opposition to the UMPA: The Act Will Hurt Divorced Women
The UMPA has also been criticized as detrimental to the best in-
terest of women.s8 8 Opponents argue that the equal division of assets
during the marriage will influence divorce courts to make the same
fifty-fifty split when the marriage is terminated. This will adversely
affect women because they are likely to need more than 50 percent of
the property at divorce because of their inferior economic position.
First, the divorced woman is frequently the custodial parent of
young children. Her financial responsibilities are increased, but she
has less opportunity to generate income because of her child care role.
Second, a woman has less opportunity to produce sufficient income
because of the pervasive discrimination against woman in the work
community. Finally, a woman who has removed herself from full-
time employment to care for children and the home will not have the
job skills and seniority that may be necessary to make her self-sup-
porting at the time of divorce.189 The concern is that the UMdPA will
put so much emphasis on equality that the courts will lose sight of the
disparate economic needs of women.
186. Sundberg, Marriage or No Marriage. The Directives for the Revision of Swedish
Family Law, 2 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 223 (1971).
187. Fratcher, Uses of Uses, 34 Mo. L. REv. 39 (1969).
188. Uniform Marital Property Act, FAiRSHARE, Dec. 1983, at 19 [hereinafter cited as
FAIR$HARE]. For a similar argument in the context of property division at di-
vorce in states with a presumption of equal division, see Fineman, Implementing
Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789.
189. Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17
FAM. L.Q. 41, 59 (1983); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Eco-
nomic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA
L. REv. 1181 (1981). See also WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
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These opponents of the U1'PA acknowledge the Act is not in-
tended to have any effect on the division of property by a divorce
court.1 90 The commissioners have stated expressly that the Act takes
the parties "to the door of the divorce court only."'191 It defines the
rights of the parties only during the marriage. The existing equitable
distribution statutes will control what percentage of the property will
be taken by the husband and what percentage will be taken by the
wife at the time of divorce. Title does not control this division. Nor is
a fifty-fifty division mandated by most equitable distribution stat-
utes.192 The divorce court is expected to take into account both the
economic disparity of the parties and to compensate them for the con-
tributions that each has made to the partnership.
Nonetheless, the opponents contend that as a practical matter the
court will be influenced by the UMPA: "[Tlhe inevitable tendency
would be to freeze property distribution to an equal allocation, since
this is the easiest thing to do for the divorce court." 9 3 If this occurs it
will not be because of the UMPA. Instead it will result if the courts
and attorneys either do not understand the dual function of property
division at divorce, or because they refuse to use it.194
190. FAiR$HARE, supra note 188, at 19.
191. UMPA, supra note 3, at § 1 (Supp. 1985).
192. For a breakdown of the statutory factors that a divorce court is required to con-
sider when dividing property in each of the fifty states, see Freed & Walker, Fam-
ily Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369, 390-95 (1985). None of
the so called equitable distribution statutes require a fifty-fifty division. Some,
however, have a presumption that the division should be fifty-fifty. See, eg., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Cure. Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 50-20(c) (1984).
193. FAIR$HARE, supra note 188, at 18.
194. There is a substantial amount of evidence that divorce courts are not giving much
weight to the disparate financial needs of the parties at the time marital property
is divided and maintenance is awarded and denied. There is a growing attitude
that if women want equality they will get it with vengeance. For example, if
maintenance is awarded at all, it will continue for only a short time on the theory
that a homemaker can take care of herself after a few months or years of "reha-
bilitation." Aella, Economic Adjustment on Marriage Breakdown. Support, 4
FAM. L. REv. 1 (1981). See generally Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth.
Does No Fault Divorce Make a Difference, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1980). Likewise,
child support orders and maintenance orders cannot exceed the husband's "abil-
ity to pay." In applying this standard, however, the courts have failed to recog-
nize that this often means that the husband's standard of living is protected at the
expense of his wife and children. See Aella, supra, at 6. As one commentator has
observed:
[Researchers in Michigan found that] over [a] seven-year period, the
economic position of divorced men, when assessed in terms of need actu-
ally improved by 17 percent. In contrast, over the same period divorced
women experienced a 29 percent decline in terms of what their income
could provide in relation to their needs ....
How does this striking contrast in economic experiences of former
husbands and wives come about? One explanation is that the wife typi-
cally assumes most of the costs of raising the couple's children. Thus,
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When the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was first introduced,
its opponents argued that no-fault divorce would permit marriage to
be easily terminated, leaving women at a financial disadvantage. To
insure that both parties retained some semblance of financial security,
property division was to be based on both contributions and need. 95
The Act directs the court to evaluate the contribution that each party
has made to the partnership, but the judge is also to take into account
the economic disparity between the spouses when the marital prop-
erty is divided. This dual function of property division has been recog-
nized in most equitable distribution states. 9 6
The dual function of property distribution takes into account con-
tributions and also the opportunity cost of those contributions. Wo-
men have traditionally provided child care and homemaking skills to
the marital partnership. These contributions enhance the quality of
life that the family enjoys, but the woman incurs a substantial oppor-
tunity cost for these contributions. When her marriage ends, she lacks
the skills or the current education that are necessary to secure more
her need for help and services increases as a direct result of her becom-
ing a single parent, while at the same time her income declines.
A second explanation lies in the inadequacy of the child support (and
in rarer cases, the alimony) which the wife is awarded. All too often this
support does not come close to compensating her for her actual costs.
Thus, she must somehow make up the deficit alone, even though she
earns much less than her former husband.
A third reason for the discrepancy is the reduced gap between the
husband's income and his needs after divorce. Although the husband
has fewer dollars than before divorce, he is not constrained to share
those dollars with his former wife and his children. Thus, the demands
on his income have diminished. As a result, the husband is left with
more surplus income than he enjoyed during marriage.
Fourth, many divorced men have received salary increases over the
years, while their obligations for alimony and child support have re-
mained fixed or dimished: some support obligations have ended, others
have been reduced (for example, a child may have reached majority),
and a good many men have simply decided to reduce or stop their sup-
port payments despite the existence of a court order. The result, once
again, is that divorced men are able to enjoy the surplus income
themselves.
Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1250, 1252-53. See also Johnson & Waldman, Most
Women who Maintain Families Receive Poor Market Returns, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Dec. 1983, at 30.
These problems, though, seem to exist whether there is a presumption of
equal division or not, and even in jurisdictions where the statutes specifically di-
rect the court to take into account the financial status of the parties.
195. Fineman, supra note 187, at 801-03, 809-11. See also R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 165 (1969) (prepared for
the Special Committee on Divorce of the Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uni-
form State Laws).
196. Freed & Walker, supra note 192, at 392. Not all states have statutes directing the
courts to take into account financial need, "but [a] major purpose of equitable
distribution in many states is to provide for future support needs." J. KRAUS-
KOPF, CASES ON PROPERTY DIvISION AT MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION 226 (1983).
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than a subsistence level living. She also lacks pension benefits that
are normally accumulated as a result of steady employment outside
the home.197
Men have traditionally produced income. These contributions en-
hance the quality of life that the family enjoys. The husband produces
immediate benefit for the family, but he also makes a long-term in-
vestment in himself. When his marriage is terminated, he already has
the seniority, the skills, the education, and retirement benefits to
maintain his standard of living. It is for these reasons that the UMDA
and equitable distribution statutes take into account not only contri-
butions to the acquisition of property, but also the relative financial
position of the parties at the termination of the marriage. Both oppor-
tunity cost and contribution are relevant factors because, as in any
partnership, the costs and benefits of the relationship are shared
equally. A system that fails to acknowledge the opportunity cost of
child care and homemaking would discourage people from assuming
those responsibilities, to the detriment of society.
This dual function of property division is still needed even though
there are substantially fewer full time homemakers in the United
States today than twenty years ago. Thousands of marriages are still
based upon the traditional model.198 Even women who have opted for
employment outside the home are generally not able to pursue their
careers in exactly the same way that their husbands do. Statistics in-
dicate that women often leave the job market when their children are
young.199 Furthermore, many of them engage in part-time work so
that they can also manage the home.2 00 Even when they work full-
time, women are still primarily responsible for child care and domes-
tic work, leaving them less time and energy to devote to their ca-
reers.201 For working women, then, as well as for the traditional
homemakers, the commitment to the family will have an impact on
their earning capacity, seniority, and retirement benefits.
Whether women or men fulfill the homemaker/child care role, the
law should not penalize the partner who is willing to balance career
advancement with the needs of the home and children. Nor should
the law be based on the erroneous premise that full-time employment
197. Aella, supra note 194, at 4; Fineman, supra note 188, at 823, 828; Note, The Need to
Value Homemaker Services Upon Divorce, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 115, 116-21 (1984).
198. Approximately 13 percent of American families can be classified as single-bread-
winner nuclear families, and approximately 16 percent as dual breadwinner nu-
clear families. Bjorksten & Stewart supra note 160, at 36.
199. SeGuret, Women and Working Conditions: Prospects for Improvement?, INT'L
LAB. REV. 301 (May - June 1983).
200. Id. at 304.
201. M. GEERKEN & W. GovE, supra note 165, at 87. In fact, there is evidence that
women who work outside the home receive less help from their husbands than
does the traditional homemaker. Id. at 91.
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means equal opportunity. The divorce courts, therefore, should con-
tinue to recognize the dual function of equitable property division,
even if the two paycheck marriage is the norm and not the exception.
The adoption of the UMPA should have no impact on the manner
in which the equitable distribution statutes are applied. The sole focus
of the UMPA is on contributions. The Act recognizes that husband
and wife each make an equal contribution to the partnership and are
therefore entitled to 50 percent of the marital property as long as the
relationship continues. The UMPA does not need to focus on opportu-
nity cost, because as long as the partnership continues, the cost of
those contributions are shared equally. If the partnership has fewer
assets because one spouse or both have reduced their earnings capacity
to care for the needs of the family, then each spouse bears the reduc-
tion in assets equally. The assets that are produced are shared equally
so neither spouse is disadvantaged. It is only when the marriage is
ended by divorce, and future assets will no longer be shared equally,
that the opportunity cost factor becomes important. Then the court
should consider the economic disparity between the parties as well as
their contributions.
Opponents of the UMPA, who are concerned that focusing on
equality will be disadvantageous to homemakers, also fail to take into
account the ominous possibility that divorce courts will distribute less
than half of the marital property to a wife on the assumption that her
contributions are not equal to her husband's. If the court starts with
the assumption that all of the property is owned by the husband, the
court might need to award the wife a substantial part of the husband's
property to equalize the economic disparity between the parties. If,
however, the court starts with the assumption that the husband and
wife each own one-half of the marital property, then a smaller per-
centage of the husband's property would be needed to equalize the
economic disparity between the parties. Thus, in an UMPA jurisdic-
tion, the judge should be more inclined to use property division to sat-
isfy the needs of the homemaker.
Nonetheless, neither the UMPA nor the common law marital
property system guarantees that the divorce courts will accept the
dual function of property division. Proper selection and education of
judges is key to that issue. It is also important that attorneys empha-
size this dual function of property when representing a spouse whose
economic status has been impaired because of the caregiving tasks per-
formed during the marriage.
VI. CONCLUSION
An important function of the Uniform Marital Property Act wil be
to focus debate on the values that our society should promote within
the institution of marriage. In the past, the choice between commu-
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nity property or separate property has been based on historical acci-
dent rather than rational choice. In France, community property
served to encourage the continued independence and strength of the
nobility. In England, the marital property system facilitated the con-
solidation of power in a central authority. Many jurisdictions in the
United States adopted the common law scheme of marital property
merely by passing legislation implementing all common law doctrines
that existed prior to 1776. The scheme was consistent with their cul-
tural heritage from England. It maintained the status quo, and there
is no evidence that its retention was a conscious choice arrived at after
public debate.
Improved communication and cultural changes now require us to
consider the alternatives. The cultural aversion to community prop-
erty that was common during the colonial and the westward expan-
sion periods has been neutralized by improved communications. We
have a better understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of
community property. In fact, the common law has now been reformed
to reflect the value of sharing when a marital partnership is termi-
nated by death or divorce. As a result, the concept of an economic
partnership is no longer foreign.
Improved communications and cultural changes have also precipi-
tated the breakdown of the patriarchal system. Women, as well as
men, can now choose the role that they wish to assume: "For the first
time in history all women in this country can see themselves in a role
other than that of full-time mother and homemaker."202 Children
will continue to be produced and the elderly will continue to need
care, but the forces that allocated those responsibilities to women are
weakening. Legislatures must now consider whether the government
or the family should be responsible for these tasks when women chose
to work outside the home. If the family is to remain responsible, what
incentives will those legislators offer to family members who are will-
ing to perform these tasks? If the stick is no longer available, then a
carrot must be substituted.
The UMPA is one incentive that the legislature can offer. The Act
encourages family members to assume responsibility for the care of
the young and the old because it assures that the caregivers and in-
come producers receive the same reward. There is equality between
the husband and wife, but the UMPA takes us one step beyond simple
equality. By promoting the value of sharing, it refocuses the energies
of the husband and wife on the needs of the marital unit as a whole,
not just on the rights of the individuals within it.
202. Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 2, at 583.
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